Frequently asked questions
Seismicity
The size of a seismic event can be measured by means of magnitude or macroseismic intensity.
- The magnitude is a physical quantity and is expressed through a pure decimal number. It is calculated from the amplitude of seismic waves recorded by seismographs or by estimating the seismic moment, also derived from instrumental recordings. Each increase of one unit of magnitude corresponds to an increase of approximately thirty times the emitted energy. The best known magnitude scale is the one proposed by Richter in the 1930s. The strongest event recorded in Italy was the Messina earthquake of 1908, with M~7.1 and more than 80,000 estimated victims.
- The macroseismic intensity (or intensity) of a seismic event classifies the effects caused on the environment, things and people and is therefore assigned to specific locations affected by the event (site intensity). The epicentral intensity represents the extrapolation of the effects that would have occurred at the epicentre, i.e., theoretically at the point on the Earth's surface closest to the source of the earthquake; in this way, intensity can be considered a measure of the energy released. In Italy, the intensity of a seismic event is evaluated according to the MCS scale (Mercalli-Cancani-Sieberg, better known as the Mercalli scale), which is composed of twelve levels. In the proposed classification, events are perceivable starting from level III; from VI to VIII, there is damage to buildings; starting from level IX, the effects are destructive, with frequent total collapses and effects on the surrounding environment.
To answer this question, it is necessary to distinguish the seismic events to which we refer.
The seismic network detects numerous signals that can be associated with seismic events related to human activities or natural events such as weather disturbances. The frequency of these signals is related to the frequency with which these events occur. With regard to weather disturbances, these are more prevalent in late spring and summer; signals related to these events are recognized and excluded from the catalogue of seismic events.
As far as signals related to human activities are concerned, trains are undoubtedly the most frequent and strongest source of seismic signals detected by the stations of the network. More specifically, the OL05 and OL06 stations are affected by the passage of trains along the line through Lodi (with an average frequency of 15-30') and by the passage of vehicles (e.g., the OL05 station is located near state highway SS9). The OL02, OL03 and OL04 stations are affected by the passage of trains along the high-speed line (with an average frequency of 10') and the traffic on the A1 freeway.
For earthquakes, the answer to this question presents some aspects of greater complexity. From the available data, it is possible to estimate an event frequency equal to 50-70 years with an intensity close to the damage threshold. In fact, the Lodigiano area is affected not only by moderate, infrequent and deep events in this sector of the Po Valley but also by more energetic and distant events, mainly those that occur along the active tectonic structures of the Southern Alps and Northern Apennines.
Lodi is the inhabited centre for which the most information is available, and the seismic history of Lodi, reported in the Macroseismic Database DBMI15 (Locati et al., 2016), consists of approximately 40 observations related to earthquakes since the Middle Ages. Since 1500, 8 events with intensities greater than or equal to 5 have been reported, without ever reaching the threshold for the first damage at the sixth level on the macroseismic scale. For further details, see the page Historical and instrumental seismicity in the section “Seismic Monitoring”.
Induced seismicity
The HiQuake database (https://inducedearthquakes.org/) lists cases of earthquake-induced seismicity around the world. For gas production and/or storage activities, the database lists the following 7 cases in 5 different countries:
- Gazli, Uzbekistan (Plotnikova et al., 1996) — Storage uses a natural gas production depot that was converted to storage in 1988. Plotnikova et al. (1996) reported seismicity with magnitudes between 4 and 5 during the storage period, especially during the first three years of reservoir filling. Since 1988, storage has been used for gas. It should be noted that the Gazli site is known for two strong earthquakes, M 6.8 in 1976 and M 7.2 in 1984, that occurred during the period of exploitation of the reservoir for gas production, which caused extensive damage and many deaths in the city of Gazli. Therefore, the seismicity detected during the subsequent period of storage may have been related to the two major events that occurred previously. However, the scientific information is rather uncertain because the available literature is mainly in the Russian language.
- Castor gas storage project, offshore Spain (Cesca et al., 2014; Gaite et al., 2016) — This project aimed to use a depleted oil field (Amposta oil field) consisting of fractured carbonate rocks located offshore in the Gulf of Valencia (northern Spain), approximately 20 km from the coast. A storage capacity of approximately 1.3 billion standard cubic metres of natural gas was planned, sufficient to meet 25% of Spain's storage needs. The seismic sequence began three days after the start of the injections, with increasing events up to ML 2.6. The injection was paused after 12 days, but this was not enough to stop the earthquakes; on the contrary, the strongest Mw 4.3 event occurred two weeks after the injection was interrupted. In total, more than 1000 earthquakes were detected, of which more than 420 had ML ≥ 2. Weak seismicity was still ongoing in 2016 (Gaite et al., 2016). The seismic sequence induced by the storage at Castor led to a strong negative public reaction because the population was very sensitive to the problem of seismic risk after the Mw 5.1 earthquake in Lorca (approximately 250 km farther south along the coast) in 2011. Following the earthquakes that occurred, the project was suspended. In retrospect, it was recognized that the gas injection activities reactivated a fault in the Amposta fault system. In addition, both the seismic monitoring infrastructure and especially the ability to analyse the seismic data collected in an effective and timely fashion were found to be inadequate.
- Bergermeer, Norg and Grijpskerk storage camps in the Netherlands (Anonymous, 2014) — For these cases, only very limited numbers of very weak events are reported, for which no scientific study has yet been published. The only documented evidence concerns some microevents with a maximum magnitude of 0.7 that occurred in 2013 at the Bergemeer repository during the cushion gas creation phase and were detected by microseismic arrays dropped into the well. Additionally, in this case, it is important to distinguish these activities from the better known gas production activity in Groeningen that has caused some known earthquakes reported in the literature.
- Háje, Czech Republic (Benetatos et al., 2013; Zedník et al., 2001) — Storage used underground caverns, and two earthquakes of magnitude 0.2 and 0.4 were recorded near the area in 2009.
- Hutubi, China (Tang et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2019) — Storage used a natural gas production depot that was converted to storage in 2013. Approximately 200 events were detected during the first gas injection cycles, with two major events of M 2.7 and M 3.0 in 2013 and some minor events in 2014, approximately 3 km and 1 km from the reservoir, respectively. The most recent study (Zhou et al., 2019) consider that these events were induced and caused by the reactivation of pre-existing faults due to the spread of poro-elastic stress.
Finally, Evans et al. (2015) reported a case of microseismicity (even better classified as nano-seismicity) detected at the storage of Germigny (northern France, aquifer storage), which has been operational since 1982. In the period between 1991 and 1992, microseismicity was detected at the instrumental level (less than 30 events), detected only by sensors dropped into deep wells and located in the production layer near the injection wells (Deflandre et al., 1993; Fabriol, 1993).
In Italy, there is no evidence of events related to gas storage activities.
It should be considered on the one hand that gas storage in Italy is carried out exclusively in depleted gas depots, and this type of storage is considered particularly safe. In many cases, the seismic monitoring of gas storage is carried out by the same (private) entity that performs the storage. However, for the storage of Collalto (TV), which is monitored with a dedicated seismic network by a public research organization (OGS) and whose data and analysis are public, there is also an absence of seismicity related to the storage activity.
Seismic monitoring
The seismograph is a tool that transforms the movement of the ground caused by a seismic event into a permanent record. It allows proper analysis and review of all seismic waves at any time.
The monitoring system continuously acquires signals from the stations of the network, analyses the signals to recognize any variations and, if these variations are found at more than one station, locates their origin and intensity. If the conditions are met, a so-called "seismic event" is declared. This entire process occurs in a few seconds from the moment the signal is recorded.
It may also happen that different events or false events due to random correspondence of signal changes are identified. Since the system is calibrated to be very sensitive (remember that the main purpose is to record microseismicity), there can be many false events. For this reason, all automatic determinations are reviewed by an experienced seismologist who analyses the detected events and confirms that they correspond to local earthquakes or events potentially related to the activity of the storage plant.
The motion of the ground recorded by the instruments is usually represented with graphs, called seismograms, which describe the movement of the ground over time. From the seismograms, it is possible to evaluate (both visually and through computer analysis) where a seismic event occurred, how strong it was and what are some of its other characteristics.
For more details, see the homonymous page.
In the seismogram, we can recognize the phases (i.e., particular traits of waveforms) related to specific wave fronts that are generated at the source or have traversed the geological structure of the Earth, which is complex, and the "seismic noise", i.e., the vibrations resulting from many processes with different origins (from atmospheric perturbations to oceanic motion, from human activities to earthquakes themselves); this noise continuously runs along the Earth's surface similar to the continuous wave motion of varying strength seen on the sea.
From the specific phases recognizable in the seismograms generated by a seismic event, it is possible to estimate (both visually and through computer analysis) where it happened, how strong it was and what are some of its other characteristics.
The structural works of the IGS Cornegliano Stoccaggio plant have been designed according to the technical standards for construction by adopting particularly strict and conservative parameters; the structures are therefore robust and certainly able to withstand the expected seismic events without sustaining damage.
In the case of hypothetical catastrophic events, much more violent and unlikely, the structures could experience localized damage but no collapse; in this case, the plant is equipped with intrinsic safety systems that, in the case of anomalies, interrupt the operations and place the plant under non-operational conditions.
Geodetic monitoring
How should the monitoring of "Cornegliano Stoccaggio" be quoted?
The reference to be mentioned for the use of parameters and information contained in this website is:
Monitoring of “Cornegliano Stoccaggio” Working Group, 2019. Monitoring of “Cornegliano Stoccaggio” website - http://rete-cornegliano.crs.inogs.it
If seismic data are used, please quote:
RSCL Working Group (2019). Cornegliano Laudense Seismic Network - http://rete-cornegliano.crs.inogs.it - https://doi.org/10.7914/SN/OL